Robert NIVELLE (1856-1924) general. 2 autograph manuscripts (fragments) and autograph notes; 10, 15 and 6 pages in-fol. Justification of the Nivelle offensive at the Chemin des Dames in April 1917. - Continuation of the conference of Compiègne (pages 2 to 11). Debates during the meeting in Compiègne, on April 6, 1917, of President Raymond Poincaré, the President of the Council, the Ministers of War, of the Navy and of Armaments, Generalissimo Nivelle and the four army group commanders. Castelnau declared that the offensive "was necessary if we did not want to leave the initiative of the operations to the enemy"; Franchet d'Espèrey said "nothing very salient"; Micheler declared "in the most categorical manner that the offensive was indispensable and that it had to be carried out without delay, under penalty of being outdone by the Germans"; Pétain supported "a limited offensive", but immediately... Nivelle's resignation was refused... - On the choice of the tactical method (pag. 5 à [17]). "I have been told in all seriousness about the Nivelle-Mangin procedure as opposed to the Pétain procedure. I do not believe that General Pétain can be more flattered than myself [...]. It is a conception that is part of a mentality that is too widespread, alas! He summarized the military and moral situation in Verdun when he arrived there at the end of March 1916, then spoke of "the offensive of April 16", insisting on the autonomy he gave to the divisional commanders, blaming the false news spread by members of parliament, and the flawed calculation of losses, "double the reality"... Without dwelling on "this subject of such delicate topicality", he assures us that the offensives of May 16 to 18 gave "the feeling of Victory won"... - Comments on a first version of this text: "Page 17 - 12th line. I would be more affirmative and I would say that: fortunately! the Parliament was in Bordeaux because [...] if it had remained in Paris, the battle of the Marne would have been impossible, we would not have let Gal Joffre do it"... Decisions concerning Foch and Micheler... "At the time of the offensive, I was so tied up, so little in control of my actions that I was in the absolute impossibility of applying the only radical remedy that was appropriate: after the Conference of Compiègne, it was necessary, or to make jump the generals Pétain, Micheler, Mazel, or to remove me "... It is necessary to insist on his efforts to defend "the plunder" of the ministers Albert Thomas and Clémentel. "At the end of April 1917, the war committee was stunned when I brought the count of what had been taken from me, of combatants [...]. This figure amounted to about 250,000 men in 4 months"... A strong file of documents is attached, some of them from the period, most of them later, collected by the historian Guy DUPRÉ for a book on the First World War: speeches, press articles, memoirs, letters, etc.